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Abstract—Although deep neural networks (DNNs) have
achieved success in many application fields, it is still vulnerable to
imperceptible adversarial examples that can lead to misclassifica-
tion of DNNs easily. To overcome this challenge, many defensive
methods are proposed. Indeed, a powerful adversarial example is
a key benchmark to measure these defensive mechanisms. In this
paper, we propose a novel method (TEAM, Taylor Expansion-
Based Adversarial Methods) to generate more powerful adver-
sarial examples than previous methods. The main idea is to
craft adversarial examples by minimizing the confidence of the
ground-truth class under untargeted attacks or maximizing the
confidence of the target class under targeted attacks. Specifi-
cally, we define the new objective functions that approximate
DNNs by using the second-order Taylor expansion within a
tiny neighborhood of the input. Then the Lagrangian multiplier
method is used to obtain the optimize perturbations for these
objective functions. To decrease the amount of computation, we
further introduce the Gauss-Newton (GN) method to speed it
up. Finally, the experimental result shows that our method can
reliably produce adversarial examples with 100% attack success
rate (ASR) while only by smaller perturbations. In addition,
the adversarial example generated with our method can defeat
defensive distillation based on gradient masking.
Index Terms—DNNs, Adversarial Examples, the Taylor Ex-
pansion, the Lagrangian multiplier method, dual problem, the
Gauss-Newton method.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rise of deep learning technology, DNNs havebeen successfully applied to many fields such as bioin-
formatics [3], [4], speech recognition [5], [6], and computer
vision [7], [8]. However, recent work shows that DNNs are
vulnerable to adversarial examples, which can fool DNNs
by adding small perturbations to the input. Szeigy et al. [9]
first reported the existence of adversarial examples in the
image classification. Although these perturbations are almost
imperceptible to human eyes, they can lead to disastrous con-
sequences such as a traffic accident caused by an adversarial
road sign image misclassified by autonomous driving systems.
Yaguan Qian, Ximin Zhang and Wei Li are with the School of Big
Data Science, Zhejiang University of Science and Technology, Hangzhou
310023, China (Email: qianyaguan@zust.edu.cn; 1289486793@qq.cn; li-
weikeyan@163.com). Bin Wang is with the Network and Information Security
Laboratory of Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd, Hangzhou
310052, China (Email: wbin2006@gmail.com). Zhaoquan Gu is with the
Cyberspace Institute of Advanced Technology (CIAT), Guangzhou Univer-
sity, Guangzhou 510006, China (Email: zqgu@gzhu.edu.cn). Haijiang Wang
is with the School of Information and Electronic Engineering, Zhejiang
University of Science and Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China (Email:
wanghaijiangyes@163.com). Wassim Swaileh is with the CY Cergy Paris
University, ETIS Research Laboratory, Paris 95032, France (Email: was-
sim.swaileh@cyu.fr).
Adversarial attacks are divided into two categories, includ-
ing untargeted attacks and targeted attacks. For untargeted
attacks, the DNNs misclassify the adversarial examples to any
class except for the ground-truth class, which include FGSM
[10], JSMA [11], C&W [12]. For targeted attacks, the DNNs
misclassify the adversarial examples to a specific target class,
which include Deepfool [13] and M-DI2-FGSM [14]. At the
same time, many defensive methods are proposed as well,
such as defensive distillation [15], adversarial training [16]
, fortified networks [17], detecting adversarial examples [18]
etc.
Up to date, adversarial training is shown as the most effec-
tive defensive method in practical experience [19]. Aleksander
et. al [16] consider adversarial training as a saddle point
problem that is composed of an inner maximization and
an outer minimization. The inner maximization aims to nd
adversarial examples that cause the maximal loss of DNNs.
Therefore, generating more powerful adversarial examples is
a key component for effective adversarial training. At the
same time, it can also be a key benchmark to measure current
defensive methods.
Generating adversarial examples is usually modeled as a
constrained optimization problem, which in general aims to
maximize the loss function of DNNs. Different from previous
work, we propose a novel approach, namely TEAM, to gen-
erate more powerful adversarial examples through minimizing
the confidences of the ground-truth class in untargeted attacks
or maximizing the confidences of the target class in targeted
attacks, where confidences is the output of DNNs. Since
DNNs are highly nonlinear, it easily falls into local minimum
when using a confidence as an objective function. To obtain a
smoother objective function, we use the second-order Taylor
expansion to approximate the DNNs in a tiny neighborhood
with regard to the input. A typical gradient decrease method
can be used to solve the above problem. As we know, unlike
FGSM to use the first-order gradient, our method is the first
attempt to generate adversarial examples using the second-
order gradient.
All current attack methods including ours rely on the
gradient of DNNs, however, previous attacks are based on
the assumption that DNNs are smooth or convex [20]. Un-
fortunately, DNNs are in general neither smooth nor convex
and researchers may have underestimated the impact of this
feature. In fact, the gradient of DNNs is extremely unsmooth
as shown in Fig.1. In Fig.1(a), the red line plots the con-
fidence of a specific class calculated by the DNN and the
blue line plots the confidence of the same class calculated
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Fig. 1. (a)the output of softmax layer to a specific class and that of the Taylor
expansion to a specific class (b)the gradient of softmax layer to a specific class
and that of the second-order Taylor expansion to a specific class
by the second-order Taylor expansion of the DNN. Their
corresponding gradients are shown in Fig.1(b). From Fig.1, we
can achieve two observations. The first is that the confidence
of second-order Taylor expansion can perfectly approximate
that of the DNN. The second is that the gradient of DNN is
not easy for optimisation, which can easily lead to a local
optimal solution [20] and after using the second-order Taylor
expansion to approximate it, it becomes smoother.
Our work shows that using the second-order Taylor expan-
sion to approximate the output of DNNs in a tiny neighbor-
hood can overcome the disadvantage of high nonlinearity of
DNNs. After that, we can construct a dual problem with the
Lagrangian multiplier method, which is a convex problem and
we can hope to get the global optimum.It means that a more
powerful adversarial example can be obtained with our second-
order method than previous first-order method.
As we know, the calculation of a second-order matrix,
known as the Hessian matrix, is usually with high computation
costs. It is also not advisable to use a secant line approximation
of the Hessian matrix. Therefore, in order to overcome the
disadvantage of the Hessian matrix, we construct a least-
squares cost function based on the DNN and use a first-
order gradient matrix to substitute the Hessian matrix with
the Gauss-Newton method.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows:
• Different from previous first-order methods, we propose a
novel second-order method to craft adversarial examples
by minimizing the confidence of the ground-truth class
under untargeted attacks or maximizing the confidence
of the target class under targeted attacks. Specifically, we
define new objective functions that approximate DNNs
by using the second-order Taylor expansion within a tiny
neighborhood of the input, which can be easily optimized.
• Our method can generate more powerful adversarial
examples than previous work. The significance of our
work lies in two aspects. The first is that more powerful
adversarial examples contribute to more robust DNNs
through adversarial training. The second is that a power-
ful adversarial example can be a significant benchmark
to measure the state-of-the-art defensive mechanisms.
• Compare to the state-of-the-art method C&W, our gener-
ated adversarial example keep less likely to be detected
by human eyes with a higher ASR. On MNIST, ASR of
our method achieves 3.8% higher with `2 = 1.84, PSNR
= 67.21 than that of C&W with `2 = 2.21 and PSNR =
60.68. On CIFAR10, ASR of our method achieves 0.8%
higher with `2 = 0.70 and PSNR = 72.86 than that of
C&W with `2 = 0.75 and PSNR = 68.52 on averagely.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Sec.II
briefly describes the related work of this paper. Sec. III
introduces background on the fundamentals of DNNs and the
most representative attack methods available nowadays. Sec.
IV describes our method TEAM with detailed mathematical
derivation. Sec.V presents the experiment evaluation with two
real datasets MNIST and CIFAR 10. In Sec. VI we conclude
our work.
We share the source code of our approach online
(https://github.com/zxm2020/the-Second-Order-Gradients-
Based-Method-for-Generating-Adversarial-Examples).
II. RELATED WORK
Since Szeigy et al. [9] discovered that DNN are vulnerable
to adversarial examples, researchers proposed a variety of
methods for generating adversarial examples, which can be
summarized as the process of defining an objective function
and then solving the optimization problem.
Szegedy et al. [9] first proposed a box-constrained optimal
perturbation method called L-BFGS. L-BFGS defined the
mapping function of image to label as an objective function
and used the linear search method to find adversarial examples
based on it. Although L-BFGS is effective, the linear search
method results in high computational complexity. Goodfellow
et al. [10] proposed FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method)
to reduce the computational complexity. FGSM constructs
the objective function based on the gradient changes of loss
function, which could perform one-step gradient update along
the direction of the sign of gradient at each pixel, therefore
32 ∞0x x 0 2 ∞
Fig. 2. An illustration of our attacks on standard convolutional neural
networks. The leftmost column is the original images. The next three columns
show adversarial examples generated by our method with `2, `∞ and `0
constrains, respectively. All the original images are classified correctly, while
the adversarial examples are misclassified to other classes. The images were
chosen randomly from the test set of MNIST and CIFAR 10.
the computation cost is extremely lower. However, FGSM
is known as a weak attack method since one-step attack
method like FGSM is easy to defend [21]. Based on FGSM,
Kurakin et al. [22] proposed BIM (Basic Iterstive Method)
that makes multi-step small perturbations along the direction
of gradient increase through iteration. Compared with FGSM,
BIM could construct more accurate perturbations, but at the
cost of larger computation. Further more, to improve BIM,
Madry et al. [16] proposed PGD (Projected Gradient Descent)
that takes the random perturbations of the original sample
in its neighborhood as the initial input, and generates the
adversarial examples after several iterations. In summary, all
these methods defined a single objective function related to the
loss function of DNNs and use different optimization methods
based on the first-order gradient to calculate the optimum of
the objective function.
Since then, researchers have proposed a variety ofother
improved algorithms. Papernot et al. [11] proposed JSMA
(Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack) for targeted attacks.
The essence of this method is to iteratively modify the two
most effective pixels to perturb based on the adversarial
saliency map, repeating the process until misclassification is
achieved. Besides, each iteration of JSMA needs to start a
new recalculation of the gradient to generate a new adversarial
saliency map. Compare to other methods, JSMA perturbs
fewer pixels. Moosav-dezfooli et al. [13] proposed a new
iterative attack method, Deepfool, which has similar effect of
FGSM and can calculate smaller perturbations. By linearizing
the boundary of the region where the image is located,
Deepfool move the image gradually to the decision boundary,
until the image is finally moved to the other side of the
decision boundary, causing the classifier to classify incorrectly.
Carlini and Wanger [12] proposed the C&W method, which
defined a new objective function to optimize distance and the
penalty term effectively. In addition, the authors introduced a
new variant to avoid the box constraint, which enhances the
accuracy of searching optimum but with a huge search cost.
According to their further study [23], [24], C&W is effective
for most of the existing adversarial detecting defenses. Xie et
al. [14] applied momentum and diverse inputs to FGSM, which
aims to improve transferability, namely M-DI2-FGSM (Mo-
mentum Diverse Inputs Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method).
In general, all these methods using the output vector of the
DNNs layer to construct objective functions, however, due to
the non-convex nature of DNNs, this methods are still easy to
fall into local optimum.
However, due to the high nonlinearity of DNNs and the
non-convex nature of their objective functions, these methods
easily trap into local optimum. Although, through experiments,
previous work has found that iterative methods like PGD
could find effective local optimums [16], and David Balduzzi
et al. [20] recognized the mathematical proof of the bounds
relative to the global optimum as an impossibility, our method
aims to find a fine-tuned local optimum theoretically and
experimentally.
III. BRACKGROUND
This section introduces the primary notion relevant to our
work, including DNNs and classic attack algorithms.
A. Deep Neural Networks and Notation
A DNN is a multidimensional function F (x) : Rn 7→ Rm
that accepts an input x ∈ Rn and produces an output S ∈ Rm.
S is the output of the softmax layer and si is the i-element
of S , which satisfies 0 ≤ si ≤ 1 and s1 + · · ·+ sm = 1. The
DNN assigns the label Y (x) = arg maxi F (x)i. Let Y (x) = y
be the ground-truth lable of x. The inputs of the softmax layer
are called logits.
An N -layer DNN accepts input x and produces the output
S as follows:
S = softmax
(
F (N)
(
F (N−1)...
(
F (1)(x)
)))
(1)
where F (i+1)(x) = σ
(
wi · F (i)(x)
)
+ bi for non-linear acti-
vation function σ(·), model weights wi and model biases bi.
In our paper, Z is the output of F (N)
(
F (N−1)...
(
F (1)(x)
))
(so Z are logits) and S = softmax (Z).
B. Adversarial Examples
Szegedy et al. [9] first observed the existence of adversarial
examples that can be constructed from a valid input x by
solving the following optimization problem:
minimizeD(x, x′) s.t. Y (x′) 6= y, x′ ∈ [0, 1]n (2)
where x′ = x + δ is the adversarial exsample and D(·) is a
distance norm, which can be `0, `2 or `∞.
4Su et al.[26] established adversarial threat models in two
dimensions, including adversarial goal and adversarial capa-
bilities:
Adversarial goal is to construct an adversarial example x′
that results in Y (x′) 6= y, which can be further divided into
two categories: (a) Untargeted attacks: the adversary seeks to
provide an input x′ that alter the output to any class different
from y , and (b) Targeted attacks: the adversary seeks to
provide an input x′ that force the output to a specific target
class Y (x′) = yt. In our work, both untargeted attacks and
targeted attacks are discussed.
Adversarial capabilities represent how much information
the adversary can obtain from the target DNN. In general, ad-
versarial capabilities can be classified as white-box attacks and
black-box attacks. White-box attacks mean that the adversary
knows almost everything about DNNs, including training data,
activation functions, topology structures, weight coefficients
and so on. Black-box attacks assume that the adversary cannot
obtain the internal information of the target DNN, except for
Z and S. In our work, we focus on white-box attacks.
C. Attack algorithms
The existing typical gradient-based methods include FGSM,
JSMA, Deepfool, C&W, M-DI2-FGSM, etc. which are used
to compare with our method.
FGSM. Goodfellow et al. [10] presented FGSM(Fast Gra-
dient Sign Method) that performes one step gradient update
along the direction of the sign of gradient at each pixel by
restricting the `∞-norm of the perturbations:
x′ = x+  · sign (∇xJ(F (x; θ), Y (x))) (3)
where J(·) is the loss function, ε is the magnitude of the
perturbation. FGSM has the advantages of low computational
complexity and the ability to generate a large number of
adversarial examples in a short time.
JSMA. Papernotet al. [11] proposed a targeted `0 attack
method by computing a saliency map using the gradients of
the last hidden layer with respect to the input. For the target
class yt, adversarial saliency map S(x, yt) is defined as :
S(x, yt)[i] =
{
0, if ∂Zyt∂x < 0 or
∑
j 6=yt
∂Zj
∂x > 0(
∂Zyt
∂x
) ∣∣∣∑j 6=yt ∂Zj∂x ∣∣∣ , otherwise (4)
In S(x, yt), a larger value indicates a higher likelihood of
fooling DNN. JSMA chooses the pixels that are most effective
to fool the network and perturbs them.
Deepfool. Moosav-dezfooli et al. [13] proposed the Deep-
fool, which employs linear approximation for gradient iterative
attack. At each iteration, Deepfool computes the minimal
perturbations of the linearlized DNN around the input as:
arg min
δ
‖δ‖2 s.t. F (x) +∇F (x)T δ = 0 (5)
The perturbations are accumulated to compute the final per-
turbation once x′ is misclassified by DNN.
C&W. Carlini and Wagner proposed a targeted attack C&W.
Based on their further studies [12], [23], [27], C&W are
effective against most existing defenses. They modeled the
process of generating adversarial examples as the following
optimization problem:
minimize d(x, x+ δ) + c · f(x+ δ)
s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n (6)
where f (x+ δ) = max (maxi 6=yt (Zi)− Zyt , 0), and d is the
distance metric.
M-DI2-FGSM. Xie et al. [14] combined momentum and
diverse inputs naturally to form a much stronger attack, Mo-
mentum Diverse Inputs Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
(M-DI2-FGSM). By performing random image re-sizing and
padding as image transformationT (·):
gn+1 = µ · gn + ∇xL (T (xn; p) , y; θ)‖∇xL (T (xn; p) , y; θ)‖1
(7)
xn+1 = Clipεx {xn + α · sign (gn+1))} (8)
where µ is the decay factor of the momentum term and gn is
the accumulated gradient.
IV. OUR APPROACH
The problem of constructing adversarial examples can be
formally defined as problem (2), yet it is is difficult for existing
algorithms to solve directly, as the properties of DNN make
it highly non-linear and non-convex. Therefore, we express
problem (2) in a different form, which is better adapted for
optimization. In addition, the Lagrangian multiplier method is
introduced to solve this problem.
A. Problem Formulation
Remind that Z are logits, Zi is the logits element of class
i, S = softmax (Z), and Si is the confidence of class i. A
larger value of Zi or Si indicates a higher likelihood that
the DNN classify the input as class i and vice versa. In our
work, we aim to minimize Zy or Sy in untargeted attacks,
which is equivalent to minimizing the likelihood of proper
classification. In targeted attacks, we aim to maximize Zyt
or Syt , which is equivalent to maximizing the likelihood of
forcing the DNN to classify the input as target class yt.
Although Zi and Si are seemed equally, there are some
differences between Zi and Si. Since Si = softmax (Zi) =
exp (Zi) /
∑m
j=1 exp (Zj), Si satisfies 0 ≤ Si ≤ 1 and
S1 + · · · + Sm = 1, which indicates that the decrease of
Sy corresponds to the increase of
∑
i 6=y Si and vice versa.
Therefore, the decrease of Sy ensures higher likelihood of
misclassification and the increase of Syt ensures higher like-
lihood of forcing the DNN to classify the input as class yt.
But Papernotet al. [11] claimed that Si will introduce extreme
derivative values through Si = softmax (Zi). Compared with
S, the decrease of Zy cannot guarantee the higher value of∑
i 6=y Zi, it is unaffected by extreme derivative values. In
order to get deep insight to the differences between zi and
si, we construct adversarial examples based on Zi and Si
respectively.
Due to DNNs’ highly non-linear and non-convex, to solve
the problem (2) is non-trivial [25]. Hence, we define some
5objective functions Ti, i=1,2,...,6 suitable for optimization. In
untargeted attacks, we minimize Ti such that the likelihood
of Y (x′) 6= y will be maximized. In targeted attacks, we
maximize Ti such that the likelihood of Y (x′) = yt will be
maximized. The corresponding Ti is defined as following:
T1(x
′) = Zy(x′)
T2(x
′) = Zyt(x
′)
T3(x
′) = Zyt(x
′)−maxi 6=yt (Zi(x′))
T4(x
′) = Sy(x′)
T5(x
′) = Syt(x
′)
T6(x
′) = Syt(x
′)−maxi 6=yt (Si(x′))
We use the alternative formulation for untargeted attacks:
minimize T1(x+ δ) or T4(x+ δ)
s.t. F (x+ δ) 6= y
x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
D(x, x+ δ) < C
(9)
and the alternative formulation for targeted attacks:
maximize T2(x+ δ) or T3(x+ δ) or T5(x+ δ) or T6(x+ δ)
s.t. F (x+ δ) = yt
x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n
D(x, x+ δ) < C
(10)
where C is a perturbation bound of δ, D is either `0, `2 or
`∞, i.e., D(x, x+ δ) = ‖δ‖p.
B. Generate adversarial examples based on the Second-order
Taylor expansion
In this section, we address how TEAM solve problem (9)
and problem (10). First, we adopt the quadratic approximation
to the nonlinear part of Ti in a tiny neighborhood of x by the
second-order Taylor Expansion. At this point, the original non-
trivial nonlinear optimization problem can be transformed into
a second-order constrained optimization problem. To solve
this, we use the Lagrangian multiplier method to construct a
dual problem, which is convex and provides an approximately
optimal solution to the original problem (9) and (10).
For the untargeted attack problem (9), we first compute the
gradient matrix ∇xSy(x), ∇xZy(x)and the Hessian matrix
∇2xSy(x), ∇2xZy(x) for the given example x.
∇xSy(x) =
[
∂Zy(x)
∂xi
]
n×1
(11)
∇xZy(x) =
[
∂Zy(x)
∂xi
]
n×1
(12)
∇2xSy(x) =
[
∂2Sy(x)
∂xi∂xj
]
n×n
(13)
∇2xZy(x) =
[
∂2Zy(x)
∂xi∂xj
]
n×n
(14)
We calculate the partial derivatives of the DNN directly, rather
than its cost function, and we differentiate with respect to x
rather than the parameters of the DNN. As a result, this allows
us to approximate Sy(x) and Zy(x) in a tiny neighborhood
of x. Our goal is to express ∇xSy(x), ∇xZy(x), ∇2xSy(x)
and ∇2xZy(x) according to one input dimension xi. We start
at softmax layer :
∂Sy(x)
∂xi
=
m∑
j=1
[
∂Sy
∂Zj
· ∂Zj
∂xi
]
(15)
Since Sy = softmax (Zy) = exp (Zy) /
∑m
p=1 exp (Zp),
Eq.(15) yields:
∂Sy(x)
∂xi
=
m∑
j=1
∂ exp(Zy)∑mp=1 exp(Zp)
∂Zj
· ∂Zj
∂xi

=
∑
j 6=y
− exp (Zy) exp (Zj)(∑m
p=1 exp (Zp)
)2 · ∂Zj∂xi

+
exp (Zy)
∑m
p=1 exp (Zp)− (exp (Zy))2(∑m
p=1 exp (Zp)
)2 · ∂Zy∂xi
=
∑
j 6=y
(
−SySj ∂Zj
∂xi
)
+
[
Sy − (sy)2
] ∂Zy
∂xi
(16)
In Eq.(16), according to SectionIII-A, all terms are known
except for ∂Zy∂xi . By calculating Zy , we have
∂Zy(x)
∂xi
=
∂σN,y
(
wN,y ·HN−1 + bN,y
)
∂xi
=
∂σN,y
(
wN,y ·HN−1 + bN,y
)
∂xi
· wN,y ∂H
N−1
∂xi
(17)
where HN−1 is the output vector of layer N−1 and z = HN .
Besides, σN,y(·) is the activation function of neuron y in layer
N . wN,y and bN,y is the weights and bias for neuron y in
layer N . In this equation, ∂H
N−1
∂xi
is the only unknown element
that we are able to compute recursively. Therefore, we get
∇xSy(x) and ∇xZy(x) by plugging these results for hidden
layers back into Eq.(16) and Eq.(17).
∇2xSy(x) and ∇2xZy(x) are calculated based on ∇xSy(x)
6and ∇xZy(x):
∇2xSy(x) =
∂2Sy(x)
∂xi∂xj
=
∂
∂xj
[
∂Sy(x)
∂xi
]
=
∂
∂xj
∑
j 6=y
(
−SySj ∂Zj
∂xi
)
+
(
Sy − (Sy)2
) ∂Zj
∂xi
]
=
∑
j 6=y
(
−SySj ∂
2Zj
∂xi∂xj
)
+
(
Sy − (Sy)2
) ∂2Zj
∂xi∂xj
(18)
∇2xZy(x) =
∂2Zy(x)
∂xi∂xj
=
∂
∂xj
[
∂Zy(x)
∂xi
]
=
∂
∂xj
[
∂σN,y
(
wN,yH
N−1 + bN,y
)
∂xi
· wN,y ∂H
N−1
∂xi
]
=
∂2σN,y
(
wN,yH
N−1 + bN,y
)
∂xi∂xj
· wN,y ∂
2HN−1
∂xi∂xj
(19)
In Eq.(18) and Eq.(19), all terms are known except for ∂
2Zj
∂xi∂xj
and ∂
2HN−1
∂xi∂xj
, which can be calculated recursively. By plugging
these results into Eq.(18) and Eq.(19), we obtain ∇2xSy(x) and
∇2xZy(x).
Second, we use the second-order Taylor Expansion to ap-
proximate the value of Sy(x) and Zy(x) in the neighborhood
U(x, δ). Since Sy and Zy contribute equally and can be
substituted for each other completely in the rest of the process,
we use the same symbol fy to denote both Sy and Zy , which
is easily understood.
fy (x
′) = fy(x+ δ)
≈ φy(δ)
= fy(x) +∇fy(x)T δ + 1
2
δT∇2fy(x)δ
(20)
x′ is the moving point in the neighborhood U(x, δ) and φy(δ)
gives the second-order approximation of fy (x′).
Finally, for the untargeted attack problem (9), we transform
it into:
minimize φy(δ) s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ C (21)
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Fig. 3. We present the relationship between the perturbation bound C and the
change of cross entropy loss of the DNN, where the adversarial examples are
generated with the objective function T1 on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets
respectively.
We construct the Lagrangian function:
P (δ, λ) = φy(δ) + λ (‖δ‖p − C)
= fy(x) +∇fy(x)T δ
+
1
2
δT∇2fy(x)δ
+ λ (‖δ‖p − C)
(22)
Now, we transformed the optimization problem (21) with
inequality constraints into an unconstrained optimization prob-
lem:
minimize P (δ, λ) (23)
To solve this optimization problem, we have the KKT condi-
tion: 
∇δP (δ, λ) = −→0
∇λP (δ, λ) = −→0
‖δ‖p ≤ C
λ ≥ 0
λ (‖δ‖p − C) = 0
(24)
And the dual problem of the problem (23), which is a convex
optimization problem and providing an approximately optimal
solution to the original problem (9):
max
λ
min
δ
P (δ, λ) s t.λ ≥ 0 (25)
According to the principle of weak duality property: (a) the
optimal value of the primal problem is not less than the optimal
value of the dual problem; (b) the primal problem is convex
and satisfies the Slater condition, the optimal value of the dual
problem equals to the optimal value of the primal problem.
However, due to the nonlinearity of DNNs, ∇2xfy(X) is
difficult to be proved as a positive definite matrix, which means
the problem (23) cannot be a convex problem. Therefore, we
think of the optimal value(δ∗, λ∗) of the dual problem as an
approximately optimal solution to the primal problem (23).
Our method to generate adversarial examples is presented in
Algorithm1.
In addition, the selection of perturbation bound C is also
involved in solving the problem (21). The larger C leads
7Algorithm 1 Generate adversarial examples based on the
Taylor expansion for untargeted attack
Input: x, y, C,
Output: x′
1: C ← 0.5, l← y
2: ∇xfy(x)←
[
∂fy(x)
∂xi
]
n×1
3: ∇2xfy(x)←
[
∂2fy(x)
∂xi∂xj
]
n×n
4: while l = y do
5: φy(δ) = fy(x) +∇xfy(x)T δ + 12δT∇2xfy(x)δ //Use
the Taylor expansion to approximate fy(x+ δ) in the
tiny neighbourhood of x
6: P (δ, λ) = φy(δ) + λ (‖δ‖p − C) //Construct the
Lagrangian function
7: (δ∗, λ∗)← maxλ minδ P (δ, λ) s.t.λ ≥ 0 //Calculate
the dual problem
8: l← Y (X + δ∗)
9: C ← C + 0.1
10: end while
11: return x+ δ∗
to the higher ASR, however the adversarial example will
be perceptible easily. Therefore, the determination of C is
crucial to the effectiveness of adversarial examples. Empiri-
cally, the most suitable C is the minimum one which satisfies
fyt(x + δ
∗) > fy(x + δ∗) after solving problem (23). Fig.3
shows relationship between C and the change of cross entropy
loss value where C changed in the range [0, 3].
For targeted attacks(10), we first compute the gradient
matrix ∇xfyt(x) and the Hessian matrix ∇2xfyt(x) for the
target class yt.
∇xfyt(x) =
[
∂fyt(x)
∂xi
]
n×1
(26)
∇2xfyt(x) =
[
∂2fyt(x)
∂xi∂xj
]
n×n
(27)
∇xfyt(x) and ∇2xfyt(x) have the same derivation with
∇xfy(x) and ∇2xfy(x), which replace y with yt. Then, we
use the second-sorder Taylor Expansion to approximate the
value of Syt and Zyt in the tiny neighborhood of x:
fyt (x
′) = fyt(x+ δ)
≈ φyt(δ)
= fyt(x) +∇xfyt(x)T δ +
1
2
δT∇2xfyt(x)δ
(28)
where φyt(δ) gives the second order approximation of fyt (x
′).
Then, we transformed problem (10) into:
maximize φyt(δ) s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ C (29)
and
maximize
[
φyt(δ)−max
i 6=yt
(φi(δ))
]
s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ C (30)
To solve the problem (29), we construct the Lagrangian
function:
Q1(δ, λ) = φyt(δ) + λ (‖δ‖p − C)
= fyt(x) +∇xfyt(x)T δ
+
1
2
δT∇2xfyt(x)δ
+ λ (‖δ‖p − C)
(31)
Next, we transformed the problem (29) into an unconstrained
optimization problem by substituting Eq.(31) in it:
maximize Q1(δ, λ) (32)
The KKT condition of problem (32) must be satisfied as
follow: 
∇δQ1(δ, λ) = −→0
∇λQ1(δ, λ) = −→0
‖δ‖p ≤ C
λ ≥ 0
λ (‖δ‖p − C) = 0
(33)
And the dual problem of problem (32):
min
λ
max
δ
Q1(δ, λ) s t.λ ≥ 0 (34)
According to the principle of weak duality property, the
optimal solution obtained from the problem (6) is the approx-
imately optimal solution to the problem (32). The algorithm
is presented in Algorithm2.
To solve the problem (30), we construct the Lagrangian
function:
Q2(δ, λ) = φt(δ)−max
i 6=yt
(φi(δ)) + λ (‖δ‖p − C)
= fyt(x) +∇xfyt(x)T δ
+
1
2
δT∇2xfyt(x)δ
+ maxi 6=yt [ fi(x) +∇xfi(x)T δ
+
1
2
δT∇2xfi(x)δ ]
+ λ (‖δ‖p − C)
(35)
After substituting Eq.(35) into problem (30), we have an
unconstrained optimization problem:
maximize Q2(δ, λ) (36)
The KKT condition of problem (38) must be satisfied as
follow: 
∇δQ2(δ, λ) = −→0
∇λQ2(δ, λ) = −→0
‖δ‖p ≤ C
λ ≥ 0
λ (‖δ‖p − C) = 0
(37)
And the dual problem of problem (36):
min
λ
max
δ
Q2(δ, λ) s t.λ ≥ 0 (38)
According to the principle of weak duality property, the
optimal solution obtained from the problem (38) is the ap-
proximately optimal solution to the problem (36). Algorithm??
shows the process of targeted attacks.
8Algorithm 2 Generate adversarial examples based on the
Taylor expansion for problem (29) and (30)
Input: x, y, C
Output: x′
1: C ← 0.5, l← y
2: ∇fyt(x)←
[
∂fyt (x)
∂xi
]
n×1
3: ∇2fyt(x)←
[
∂2fyt (x)
∂xi∂xj
]
n×n
4: while l 6= yt do
5: φt(δ) = fyt(x) +∇xfyt(x)T δ+ 12δT∇2xfyt(x)δ //Use
the Taylor expansion to approximate fyt(x+ δ) in the
tiny neighbourhood of x
6: (δ∗, λ∗)← minλ maxδ Qi(δ, λ), i ∈ {1, 2} s.t.λ ≥ 0
//Calculate the dual problem
7: l ← Y (X + δ∗)
8: C ← C + 0.1
9: end while
10: return x+ δ∗
C. Generate Adversarial Examples Based On The Gauss-
Newton Method
Since Sec. IV-B involves the calculation of the Hessian
matrix which requires a large amount of calculation, this
section describe the GN method for improvement. The GN
is a specialized method for minimizing the least-squares cost
(1/2) ‖fyt(x+ δ)‖2. Given a point x , the pure form of the
GN method is based on linear function fyt(x+ δ) to obtain
R
(
x+ δ, x+ δk
)
= fyt(x) +∇fyt(x)T
(
δ − δk) (39)
and then minimizing the norm of the linear function R:
δk+1 = arg min
δ∈Rm
1
2
∥∥R (x+ δ, x+ δk)∥∥2
= arg min
δ∈Rm
1
2
{
2
(
δ − δk)T ∇fyt(x)fyt(x)
+
(
δ − δk)T ∇fyt(x)∇fyt(x)T (δ − δk)
+ ‖fyt(x)‖2
}
(40)
Assuming that the matrix ∇fyt(x)∇fyt(x)T is invertible, the
above quadratic minimization yields:
δk+1 = δk − (∇fyt(x)∇fyt(x)T )−1∇fyt(x)fyt(x) (41)
Notice the high nonlinearity of DNNs, we cannot prove the
matrix ∇fyt(x)∇fyt(x)T is invertible. To ensure descent, and
also to deal with the case where the matrix ∇fyt(x)∇fyt(x)T
is singular (as well as enhance convergence when this matrix
is nearly singular), the Eq.(41) is rewrited as follows:
δk+1 = δk − αk (∇fyt(x)∇fyt(x)T + ∆k)−1∇fyt(x)fyt(x)
(42)
where αk is a stepsize chosen by one of the stepsize rules. The
matrix ∇fyt(x)∇fyt(x)T is a symmetric matrix certainly, so
there is a matrix ∆k = −λmin
(∇fyt(x)∇fyt(x)T ) I that is a
diagonal matrix that makes ∇fyt(x)∇fyt(x)T + ∆k positive
definite, as shown in Algorithm3.
Algorithm 3 Generate adversarial examples based on the
Gauss-Newton Method
Input: x, yt, C, δ, l
Output: x
1: δ ← 0, l← y
2: while l 6= yt and ‖δ‖p ≤ C do
3: ∇fyt(x)←
[
∂fyt (x)
∂xi
]
m×1
,
4: H ← ∇fyt(x) · ∇fyt(x)T ,
5: ∆k ← −λmin
(∇fyt(x)∇fyt(x)T ) I
6: δk+1 = δk − αk (H + ∆k)−1∇fyt(x)fyt(x)
7: x← x+ δ
8: l← Y (x)
9: return x
Although GN cannot produce closer adversarial examples
since the substitution of the Hessian matrix H + ∆k does
not work as well as the Hessian matrix, GN is better suited to
generating synthetic digits that are meaningless to human eyes
but still classified as each digit as shown in Fig 10. Sec. V-C
performs generating synthetic digits using GN.
V. EVALUATION
We do some experimental evaluation to answer the follow-
ing questions: (1) In all possible objective functions, which one
performs better?, (2) Compared with attacks that reported in
previous literature, what’s our advantage?, (3) Can we exploit
any x? and (4) Can we defeat defensive distillation?. Our main
result is that TEAM can craft adversarial examples with a
100% ASR by modifying the input on average by. Compared
with these attacks, TEAM achieved highest ASR by 100%
with lowest distortion. We define a attack power measure to
identify adversarial examples are more powerful than others.
We conducted our experiments on MNIST [28] and CI-
FAR10 [29] data sets. MNIST is widely used for digit-
recognition tasks, which has a training set of 60,000 examples,
and a test set of 10,000 examples. Each example includes
a 28×28 pixels grey image associated with its ground-truth
label. The digits have been size-normalized and centered in
a fixed-size image. CIFAR10 is suitable for a small image
recognition task, which is divided into five training batches and
one test batch, each with 10,000 examples. Each example in
CIFAR10 consists of colour images of 3 channels with the size
of 32×32 pixels. We train two models, whose architecture are
given in TABLE I, on the MNIST and CIFAR10 and achieve
the classification accuracy of 99.3% and 82% respectively.
TABLE I
MODEL ARCHITECTURE FOR MNIST AND CIFAR10 DATA SETS
Layer Type MNIST Model CIFAR10 Model
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×32 3×3×64
Max Pooling 2×2 2×2
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×64 3×3×128
Max Pooling 2×2 2×2
Fully Connected + Sigmoid 200 256
Softmax 10 10
9 0         1        2        3         4        5        6        7         8        9 
 0 
 
 1 
 
 2   
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5  
 
 6  
 
 7 
 
 8  
 
 9 
Targeted attack (     ) 0
Fig. 4. Our `0 attack applied to the MNIST data set conducting a targeted
attack for each target class.
In addition, we use `p, PSNR [30] and ASR to measure the
effectiveness of TEAM. `p norm is a widely-used distance
metric, often written as ‖x− x′‖p, where p-norm ‖·‖p is
defined as
‖v‖p =
(
n∑
i=1
|vi|p
) 1
p
(43)
More specifically, `0 measures the number of i such that
xi 6= x′i. `2 measures the standard Euclidean distance between
xi and x′i. `∞ measures the maximum change of xi. Since
no distance metric is a perfect measure of human perceptual
similarity [12], we add PSNR as another distance metric. We
believe PSNR is an important indicator to measure δ, since
an image changed with larger PSNR value is less likely to
be detected by human eyes. When ASR is not 100%, `p and
PSNR are used for successful attacks only. (That is, we only
calculates `p and PSNR value for adversarial examples that
fooled DNN successfully.)
A. Comparison Between Objective Functions
TABLE II
EVALUATION OF UNTARGETED ATTACK BY DIFFERENT OBJECTIVE
FUNCTIONS ON MNIST AND CIFAR10. WE SHOW THE AVERAGE `2
DISTORTION, PSNR AND ASR OF THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION T1 AND T4 .
MNIST CIFAR10
`2 PSNR ASR `2 PSNR ASR
T1 0.91 73.03 100% 0.29 87.41 100%
T4 1.40 71.46 100% 0.30 87.45 100%
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Fig. 5. Our `2 attacks applied to the MNIST data set conducting a targeted
attack for each target class.
TABLE III
EVALUATION OF TARGETED ATTACK BY DIFFERENT OBJECTIVE
FUNCTIONS ON MNIST AND CIFAR10 DATA SETS. WE SHOW THE
AVERAGE `2 DISTORTION, PSNR AND ASR OF THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
T2 , T3 , T5 AND T6 .
MNIST CIFAR10
`2 PSNR ASR `2 PSNR ASR
Best
Case
T2 1.12 77.21 100% 0.65 74.83 100%
T3 4.45 50.13 100% 3.74 56.17 100%
T5 1.23 65.31 100% 0.73 70.12 100%
T6 4.87 45.32 100% 4.17 50.16 100%
Average
Case
T2 1.84 67.21 100% 0.70 72.86 100%
T3 5.12 45.26 75.2% 4.52 46.71 70.1%
T5 2.1 69.15 100% 1.3 67.26 100%
T6 5.31 41.74 78.5% 4.50 48.34 73.5%
Worst
Case
T2 2.64 58.75 100% 0.75 73.12 100%
T3 6.54 39.17 74.5% 5.62 45.13 69.7%
T5 3.41 55.12 100% 2.50 60.73 100%
T6 5.80 40.12 75.6% 5.17 46.25 71.2%
For objective function T (·), we evaluate the quality of the
adversarial examples from each objective function on two
data sets. T1 and T4 can both reach 100% ASR with lower
distance metric and higher PSNR. Experimental results are
shown in TABLE II and TABLE III. TABLE II is the results
for untargeted attacks. The only difference between T1 and T4
is that the gradient of T1 comes from the last hidden layer,
while that of T4 comes from the softmax layer. Since the
experimental results obtained by T1 and T4 differed slightly,
we conclude that unlike JSMA, extreme derivative values
10
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Fig. 6. Our `∞ attack applied to the MNIST data set conducting a targeted
attack for each target class.
introduced by Si does not affect TEAM.
In TABLE III, we proposed three different approaches to
choose the target class in targeted attacks: “Average Case”
means that we select the target class randomly among the set
of labels that is not the ground-truth one. “Best Case” means
performing the attack against all the classes except for the
ground-truth one and reporting the target class that is least
difficult to attack. “Worst Case” means performing the attack
against all the classes and report the target class that is the most
difficult to attack. As shown in TABLE III, T2 and T5 perform
better than others. Besides, the only difference between T2 and
T5 is that the gradient of T2 comes from the last hidden layer
and the gradient of T5 comes from the softmax layer. T2 and
T5 always achieve 100% ASR, which outperform T3 and T6,
since the increase of T3 and T6 does not closely related to the
confidence of target class. Results from TABLE III also show
that extreme derivative values introduced by Si does not affect
TEAM and TEAM performs well both on the last hidden layer
and softmax layer , which means our method could defeat the
defense methods based on gradient masking, such as defensive
distillation [15].
B. Comparison Between Existing Classic Methods And TEAM
To measure the effectiveness of TEAM, we compared the
performance of TEAM with the previous classical targeted at-
tacks, including JSMA(`0 norm), C&W(`2 norm), FGSM(`∞
norm) and untargeted attacks including Deepfool(`2 norm) and
M-DI2-FGSM(`2 norm) on the same test data set.
We re-implement JSMA, C&W, FGSM, Deepfool and M-
DI2-FGSM for comparison. The codes of JSMA, C&W,
FGSM and Deepfool come from Cleverhans [31] and the codes
for M-DI2-FGSM come from the link given by the author in
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Fig. 7. Our `0 attack applied to the CIFAR10 data set conducting a targeted
attack for each target class.
the original text [14]. In addition, to ensure the validity of the
evaluation, we use the same model architecture in TABLE I
and the same batch of test data. For JSMA, we make  = 1
for every iteration and the stop condition is to meet a success
attack. That is, under the targeted attack, we report metrics
only if JSMA produces the target label, no matter how many
perturbation pixels JSMA required. For C&W, we choose the
`2 attack and set the scaling factor C = 1.0. For FGSM,
we make perturbation bound ε = 0.01, and epochs = 1. For
Deepfool, we set epochs = 3. For M-DI2-FGSM, we set the
maximum perturbation bound of each pixel ε = 0.05 and
decay factor is set to be 1.
For our experiments, we randomly selected 300 images that
could be correctly judged by the DNN in the test set on
MNIST and CIFAR10. The results compared with targeted
attacks are reported in TABLE IV and the results compared
with untargeted attacks are reported in TABLE V. Fig.4 to
Fig.cifarlinf show our `0 attacks, `2 attacks and `∞ attacks
applied to the two models for each target classes respectively.
A powerful adversarial example should be an example with
high ASR and keep less likely to be detected by human
eyes(low `p value, high PSNR), and both two are indispens-
able. In TABLE IV, for each distance metric, our attacks
achieve 100% ASR and keep `p value lower than the state-of-
the-art attacks with `0 and `2 distance metric. Although prior
`∞ attacks find closer adversarial examples, our `∞ attack
achieve higher ASR. In TABLE V, our attacks find closer
adversarial examples than the previous state-of-the-art attacks,
and our attacks never fail to find an adversarial example.
JSMA uses the last hidden layer instead of the softmax layer
to calculate the adversarial saliency map. Although the last
hidden layer does not lead to extreme derivative values, it has
11
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Fig. 8. Our `2 attack applied to the CIFAR10 data set conducting a targeted
attack for each target class.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF THREE TARGETED ATTACKS ALGORITHMS ON THE
MNIST AND CIFAR10 DATA SETS.
MNIST CIFAR10
`p PSNR ASR `p PSNR ASR
Best
Case
OurL0 20 71.21 100% 21 74.32 100%
JSMA 25 68.54 100% 25 70.16 100%
OurL2 1.12 77.21 100% 0.65 74.83 100%
C&W 1.40 61.66 100% 0.7 73.26 100%
Our`∞ 1.34 70.86 100% 1.32 70.56 100%
FGSM 0.27 85.47 80% 0.036 91.72 85.3%
Average
Case
OurL0 56 53.23 100% 93 66.73 100%
JSMA 76 51.49 100% 115 63.12 100%
Our`2 1.84 67.21 100% 0.70 72.86 100%
C&W 2.21 60.68 96.2% 0.75 68.52 99.2%
Our`∞ 2.32 70.90 100% 2.10 69.74 100%
FGSM 0.36 83.10 45.3% 0.085 89 31.7%
Worst
Case
Our`0 180 43.16 100% 256 53.19 100%
JSMA 183 40.19 100% 271 51.23 100%
Our`2 2.64 58.75 100% 0.75 66.13 100%
C&W 3.30 50.80 93.7% 0.83 69.54 98.8%
Our`∞ 3.10 61.34 100% 3.2 65.12 100%
FGSM - - 0% 0.34 80.12 1%
its own properties that the increase of Zt does not bring the
decrease of
∑
i 6=t Zi. Therefore, the pixels selected by Eq.(4)
are not technically the key pixels in the targeted attack, which
leads to larger `0. Fortunately, our method is not affected by
either derivative values of the softmax layer or properties of the
last hidden layer, since Lagrangian multiplier method is able
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Fig. 9. Our `∞ attack applied to the CIFAR10 data set conducting a targeted
attack for each target class.
TABLE V
COMPARISON BETWEEN UNTARGETED ATTACK ALGORITHMS ON THE
MNIST AND CIFAR10 DATA SETS.
MNIST CIFAR10
`2 PSNR ASR `2 PSNR ASR
T1 0.91 73.03 100% 0.29 87.41 100%
T4 1.40 71.46 100% 0.30 87.45 100%
Deepfool 2.21 73.80 100% 0.9 85.20 99.6%
M-DI2-FGSM 3.14 65.12 100% 1.85 75.12 99.4%
to achieve the optimal solution approximately to the origin
problem regardless of S and Z.
C&W and our method have similar objective functions,
while our method use the second-order Taylor expansion to
improve objective functions and use Lagrangian multiplier
method instead of gradient descent to optimize them. Com-
pared to traditional hill climbing methods, the Lagrangian
multiplier method can achieve better optimization results.
FGSM is known as a weaken attack that aims at generating a
large number of adversarial examples in a short time. It cares
less about ASR, which leads to 0% ASR in the worst case.
Deepfool and M-DI2-FGSM underestimate the fact that
DNN are neither smooth nor convex, which leads to dis-
continuous and shattered gradients. And the discontinuous or
shattered gradients likely lead to a local optimal solution.
While our method use the second-order Taylor expansion
to approximate the output value of the last hidden layer or
softmax layer locally, which can overcome the discontinuous
or shattered gradients problem.
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Totally Black 
Totally White 
Fig. 10. The targeted attack for the MNIST where the starting image is totally
black or white.
With our targeted attack, we can begin with any input even it
makes no sense to human beings and find adversarial examples
of any target classes. Based on this, in Fig.10 we show
the results of using TEAM and GN to generate adversarial
examples and make them classify as each class with respect
to an entirely-black and entirely-white image. Papernotet al.
[11] performed `0 task before, however, for classes 0, 2, 3
and 5, one can recognize the target class. While none of the
classes can be recognized with our more powerful attacks.
Notice that the entirely-black image requires no change to
become class and the entirely-black image requires no change
to become class because they are initially classified as class 1
and class 8.
D. Applying Our Attacks to Defensive distillation
Hinton et al. [32] proposed distillation to transfer knowledge
from a large model (teacher model) to a distilled model
(student model). Papernot et al. [15] exploited the notion of
distillation to make the DNN robust against adversarial exam-
ples, namely defensive distillation. They extract the knowledge
in the form of class probability vectors of the training data
from the teacher model and feed back to train the student
model. To be more specific, they use the teacher model to label
all the examples in the training set with their output vectors,
namely soft label. Then, they use the soft labels instead of
the original hard labels to train the student model. Distillation
increase the accuracy on the test set as well as the speed of
training the student model [32], [33]. In defensive distillation,
the teacher model shares the same size with the student model
and a distillation temperature constant G is used to force the
student model to become more confident in its predictions.
Defensive distillation modifies the softmax function by
adding a temperature constant G:
Si(x,G) =
exp(zi/G)∑m
j=1 exp(zj/G)
(44)
A larger G forces the DNN to produce Si with relatively large
values for each class. Since Zi become negligible compared
to temperature G, Si converge to 1/N when G → ∞. In
other words, the larger the value of G is, the more ambiguous
Si will be, because all Si are close to 1/N . Defensive
distillation proceeds in four steps: (1) train a teacher model
with temperature G; (2) calculate soft labels from the teacher
model; (3) train the student model with soft labels trained at
temperature G; and (4) test the student model with G = 1.
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Fig. 11. ASR of several typical adversarial attacks on a distillation defense
with different distillation temperatures
In [15], increasing G was found to reduce ASR effectively.
It goes from ASR = 95.89% when G = 0 to ASR = 0.45%
when G = 100 on MNIST data set. We re-implement this
experiment on MNIST and CIFAR10 with our attacks. We
repeat the attack and vary the distillation temperature each
time. The value of ASR for the following distillation temper-
atures G:{1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100} is measured.
To compared with other attacks, we re-implement the same
experiments with JSMA, FGSM, Deepfool and M-DI2-FGSM.
We didn’t compare with C&W, since C&W has been proved
in [12], which could achieve 100% ASR. We train DNN with
the temperature G varied from G = 0 to G = 100. Fig.(11)
plots the value of ASR with respect to temperature G against
different attacks where `0 attacks keep ‖δ‖0 ≤ 112, `2 attacks
keep ‖δ‖2 ≤ 3.0 and `∞ attacks keep ‖δ‖∞ ≤ 0.3.
Fig.(11) shows that defensive distillation turns out to be very
effective to most of existing attacks, including JSMA, FGSM,
Deepfool and M-DI2-FGSM. However, defensive distillation
provides only marginal value to our attacks. All of our attacks
succeed with 100% ASR.
Furthermore, we investigate the reason why distilled net-
work make JSMA, FGSM, Deepfool and M-DI2-FGSM at-
tacking harder. When a distilled network was trained at tem-
perature G > 1 and test at temperature G = 1, an increasing
G will reduce the absolute value of all components of ∇xS
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[2]. When G = 100, FGSM, Deepfool and M-DI2-FGSM
are all failed due to the fact that all components of ∇xS are
zero. However, JSMA fails for another reason. JSMA treats all
xi equally, regardless of how much they change the softmax
output [12]. Therefore, JSMA fail to choose the xi that leads
to the most changes.
However, our objective functions doesn’t rely on ∇xS,
which make our attacks stay powerful to defense method based
on gradient masking.
VI. CONCLUSION
For evaluating the effectiveness of defense or training more
robust DNNs, a powerful adversarial example is necessary.
Different from previous first-order methods, we propose a
novel second-order method namely TEAM, which approxi-
mates the output value of the DNN in a tiny neighborhood
with regard to the input. For generating synthetic digits, an
improved version of TEAM using GN can generate adversarial
examples quickly without calculating the Hessian matrix. The
experimental results show that TEAM achieves higher ASR
with fewer perturbations compared with previous methods
both in targeted attacks and untargeted attacks. Compare to
the state-of-the-art method C&W, our generated adversarial
example keep less likely to be detected by human eyes with
a higher ASR. Besides, adversarial examples generated by
TEAM defeated the defensive distillation that based on the
gradient masking. In future work, we plan to propose more
powerful attacks based on the second-order gradient with less
computation to evaluate the robustness of DNNs directly.
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